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7. There should be a specific offence of wilful neglect and 
ill-treatment on the lines of section 83 of the 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, or section 1 of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
o
8. The Court of Protection should have the power to 
require the Official Solicitor to prepare a welfare 
report on an IP for the Court (the cost of preparing 
which should fall upon the Official Solicitor's 
budget). ^
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The members of the Working Group who contributed to the 
deliberations of the Working Part)' on Decision making tor 
Incapacitated Adults were:
RM. Harris, chairman; Ms Barbara Beaton, Age Concern; Ms N 
Finch, barrister; Mr Francis QC; Ms Liz Humphreys, Lord 
Chancellor's Department; Mrs Claire Johnston, Official 
Solicitor's Office; Ms. Nicola Mackintosh, Mackintosh Duncan; 
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The effects of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 on arbitration
by William Robinson
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Act) gives 'further effect' to certain rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). The Lord Chancellor described the 
aim of the legislation as enabling 'people ... to argue for their rights and claim their remedies 
under the Convention in any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom.' The issues under 
consideration in (582 HL Official Report (5th Series), col. 1228 (3 November 1997) paper are 
whether the Act affects commercial arbitration and, if so, to what practical extent.
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE 
CONVENTION AND THE ACT
Whilst certain substantive Convention rights may arise in 
commercial arbitration, for example, the right to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence (Art. 8), 
freedom of expression (Art. 10) and the right to property 
(Art. 1 of the First Protocol) it is the procedural rights 
enshrined in Art. 6(1) of the Convention that are likely to 
arise most frequently, and which will be considered in this 
paper. Article 6(1) provides:
'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.'
As to the Act, a number of difficult points of 
interpretation arise. For the purposes of this paper, it is 
sufficient to identify three core provisions that are relevant
to the central question of the potential application of the 
Act to arbitration.
First, section 1 of the Act identifies the articles of the 
Convention that are to 'have effect for the purposes of this 
Act'. As to the interpretation of Convention rights, 'a 
court or tribunal' must take account of the rulings of the 
Strasbourg institutions consisting of the European Court 
of Human Rights (the court], the Commission on Human 
Rights (the Commission) and the Committee of Ministers. 
'Tribunal' is defined in section 21(1) as 'any tribunal in 
which legal proceedings mav be brought'.or o j o
Second, section 3 of the Act requires that, 'so far as it is 
possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible 
with Convention rights.' This rule of interpretation does 
not affect the validity of primary (and certain subordinate) 
legislation.
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Third, specific obligations are placed on 'public 
authorities'. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that, 'It is 
unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right'. 'Public authority' 
includes '(a) a court or tribunal, and (b) any person 
certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature...' (see section 6(3)).
VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION
In Bramelid and Malmstrom v Sweden (1982) DR 64, 
EcomHR Application 8588/79 the Commission drew a 
distinction between compulsory and voluntary 
arbitration:
'[a] distinction must be drawn between voluntary arbitration 
and compulsory arbitration. Normally Article 6 poses no 
problem where arbitration is entered into voluntarily ---If, 
on the other hand, arbitration is compulsory in the sense of 
being required by law ... the parties have no option but to 
refer their dispute to an arbitration Board, and the Board 
must offer the guarantees setjorth in Article 6(1).'
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
The application of the Convention and the Act to 
compulsory arbitration can be dealt with briefly. Indeed, 
in Scarth v United Kingdom EcomHR Application 
33745/96, judgment dated 22 July 1999 (unreported), 
the United Kingdom Government admitted, and theo '
Court found, a breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention 
in circumstances where an arbitrator appointed in 
accordance with compulsory arbitration under the 
County Court Rules refused to hear the matter in 
public. Accordingly, the Act applies to compulsory 
arbitration, by virtue of section 6 of the Act, as either a 
'tribunal' in which legal proceedings must be brought 
and/or a public authority whose functions are of a public 
nature.
Nevertheless, the application of the Act and Article 
6(1) to compulsory arbitrations need not necessarily 
require that each and every guarantee provided by that 
Article must be adhered to in each case. Two derogations
o
are possible. First, parties to compulsory arbitration may 
voluntarily waive their Article 6(1) rights. Second, if the 
compulsory arbitration procedures breach the 
guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1), such breaches may 
be 'cured' if a right of appeal exists (which need not be 
exercised) to a court or tribunal with competence to 
hear a full de novo appeal on all issues of fact and law. In 
Albert S^Le Compt v Belgium (1983) EHRR 533, para.29, 
the ability of an appeal to 'cure' any Article 6(1) defects 
in the compulsory arbitration must be evaluated having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case and the 
statutory procedures. These issues arise, and will be 
considered in more detail, in respect of voluntary 
arbitration.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
In respect of voluntary commercial arbitration, two 
issues arise: (i) does the Act apply, whether directly or 
indirectly, to commercial arbitration; and (ii) if so, may 
parties waive their rights under Article 6(1), how may a 
waiver be given and to what extent?
o
Does the Act apply to Commercial Arbitration?
The Act may apply to commercial arbitration by a 
variety' of means. Three arguments are addressed below.
The first argument, which has found some support in 
the literature, suggests that voluntary arbitration is a 
'public authority' within section 6 of the Act as either a 
'tribunal' or as exercising 'functions of a public nature'. 
(See Ambrose, Arbitration and the Human Rights Act 
LMCLQ 2000, 4 (Nov), 468-494. If correct, arbitrators 
would be required to apply Article 6(1) directly (subject to 
issues of waiver, discussed below). The direct application 
of the Act is certainly true of compulsory arbitration. In 
Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329 
(Judgment dated 8 July 1986, para. 201) in which the 
court held that a statutory arbitration procedure laid 
down under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 
fell within Article 6(1). The Government acknowledged 
during the passage of the Human Rights Bill that 
immigration; housing and employment tribunals would 
fall within section 6. There are, however, numerous and 
persuasive reasons why this argument is flawed in respect 
of voluntary arbitration.
  The definition of 'tribunal' is implicitly linked to the 
exercise of 'functions of a public nature'. For example, 
the Eord Advocate's reasoning as to why Church of 
Scotland courts would not constitute 'tribunals' within 
the Act relied upon the private nature of the process and 
the absence of the exercise of judicial functions on 
behalf of the state.
  It is clear that judicial review, the 'most valuable asset' in 
defining "public authority", (Jack Straw MP (17 June 
1998) 314 HC Official Report (6th Series) col. 409) is 
not available in respect of voluntary arbitration.
  The Court has, as seen above, distinguished between 
compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The 
Convention's unwillingness to hold a state responsible 
for voluntary arbitration is demonstrated in R v 
Switzerland (1987) 51 DR 83. The arbitrators in 
question had taken over seven years to reach their 
decision (the national court reached a decision on 
appeal within nine months). R complained that the 
arbitrators' delay breached the Article 6(1) right to a 
decision within a reasonable time. The Commission 
found that, having regard to the nature of the voluntary 
arbitration, 'the State cannot be held responsible for the 
arbitrators' actions unless, and only insofar as, the 
national courts were required to intervene.' As the 25
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courts had dealt with the matter expeditiously, the 
complaint was dismissed. The time taken before the 
voluntary arbitration was implicitly ignored for the 
evaluation of Article 6(1).
  The Court of Justice of the European Communities has 
not recognised voluntary arbitration as an organ of the 
State. As such, an arbitral tribunal is not a 'tribunal' 
within Article 234 EC capable of making a reference for 
a preliminary ruling Case 102/81, Nordsee [1982] ECR 
1095.
* As to the definition of 'tribunal' in section 21 of the Act, 
it must be doubted whether arbitral proceedings are 
''legal proceedings' and also whether voluntary arbitration 
is a tribunal 'in which legal proceedings may be brought"1 
(emphasis added). In these circumstances, it is unlikely 
that voluntary arbitration falls within section 6 of the 
Act. See, by analogy, Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland 
Securities Ltd [2001] BLR 272, TCC, in which Bowsher J 
held that an 'adjudicator' in a construction claim was not 
a 'tribunal under the Act. This conclusion preserves the 
flexibility that parties chose by virtue of arbitration.
The second argument relies upon the duty of 
arbitrators to apply English law, where so chosen. That 
duty flows from the Arbitration Act 1996, section 46(1), 
and common law in President of India v La Pintado CNSA 
[1985] AC 104; Wealands v CLC Contractors Ltd [1999] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 739. Even if the Convention was not 
incorporated into English law in the manner traditional 
for public international law instruments, both the purpose 
of the Act and the wording of section 1(2) make plain that 
the identified Convention rights are to 'have effect' in
o
English law. That effect is crystallised in the interpretative 
obligation set out in section 3, the breadth of which haso '
been recognised most recently by the House of Eords in R 
v A [2001] UKHE 25, e.g. per Lord Steyn, paragraph 44. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the Act's Convention rights 
now form part of English public policy. See, by analogy, 
Case C-7/98, Krombach, judgment of 28 March 2000 (not 
yet reported) in which the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities held that Convention rights 
constituted 'public policy' reasons which a Member State 
may invoke to refuse recognition and enforcement of 
judgments under the Brussels Convention. Arbitrators are 
under an obligation to apply English law, including the Act, 
by reason of such general principles.
This argument is supported by the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 that provide, notably, recognition and 
enforceability of arbitral awards, immunity from suit upon 
arbitrators acting in their judicial role and an application 
to the Commercial Court on grounds of error of law and 
serious procedural irregularity. Sections 66, 74 and 68 and 
69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, respectively.
Reliance on the Arbitration Act 1996 leads to a third 
argument regarding the application of the Act to voluntary 
arbitration. As arbitral awards may be recognised and
enforced by the Commercial Court, and appeals lodged 
with that court, the issue arises as to whether the 
Commercial Court may enforce or sanction an award 
engendering a breach of the Act, or reach otherwise than 
in conformity with Article 6(1). It is arguable that the 
Commercial Court's obligation not to act incompatibly 
with Convention rights precludes the enforcement or 
sanctioning of awards that contain breaches of those rights 
or was reached in breach of the Act. There is significant 
force in this argument, although it must be nuance in light 
of the case law of the Strasbourg Court.
According to Convention case-law, the manner ofo '
application of Article 6 to proceedings before appeal 
courts depends on the special features of the proceedings 
involved; account must be taken of the proceedings as a 
whole and of the role of the appellate court, Axen v Germany 
(1984) 6 EHRR 195. The Commission considered the 
exercise of appellate functions over arbitration awards in 
Nordstrom-] anzon (1996) 87 DR 112, EcomHR 
Application 28101/95, decision 27 November 1996.
In that case, an arbitral tribunal rendered an award 
pursuant to arbitration proceedings regarding the 
interpretation of a joint-venture agreement. The applicant 
sought to quash the award on the ground that there was an 
alleged appearance of impartiality of one of the arbitrators. 
The Dutch courts rejected that application as they 
considered that there were no objectively justified reasons 
for questioning the independence and impartiality of the 
arbitrator. The Commission's decision to reject the 
complaint of a breach of Article 6(1) is grounded in the 
waiver of those rights by virtue of the agreement to 
arbitrate. As to the control of arbitration proceedings 
exercised by the courts, the Commission noted that:
'Dutch law contains rules which permit the courts to quash 
arbitral awards on specific grounds.
and found that:
'it cannot be required under the Convention that national 
courts must ensure that arbitral proceedings have been in 
conformity with Article 6 of the Convention. In some respects 
- in particular as regards publicity - it is clear that arbitral 
proceedings are often not even intended to be in conformity 
with Article 6, and the arbitration agreement entails a 
renunciation ojthejull application of that Article. The 
Commission therefore considers that an arbitral award does 
not necessarily have to be quashed because the parties have 
not enjoyed all the guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6), but each 
Contracting State may in principle decide itself on which 
grounds an arbitral award should be quashed.
Accordingly, the limited review by Dutch courts on 
grounds of public order interests and the necessity for 
strong reasons for quashing an award were in conformity 
with the Convention. The Commission recognised both 
the practical and policy requirement to limit the review of 
arbitral awards.
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An appeal from an arbitral award and human rights 
considerations were examined by the Commercial Court in 
Mousaka Inc v Golden Seagull Maritime Inc and others, 
Judgment dated 20 July 2001, Steel J (unreported). Mr 
Justice Steel was requested to provide reasons (as allegedly 
required in those circumstances by Article 6(1)) for a 
decision not to permit an application under section 69 of 
the Arbitration Act 1996. He had regard to the nature of the 
arbitration proceedings and heard argument as to the 
Convention's requirements for appellate courts to give 
reasons on permission decisions, Webb v United Kingdom 
(1997) 24 EHRR CD 73. Mr Justice Steel held that the 
Commercial Court was not required to give reasons. He 
found that decision to be consistent with the Convention 
and Nordstrom-Janzon. Whilst it is not stated in the 
judgment that the court regarded itself as bound by the Act 
in these circumstances, there can be no reason for the 
examination of the Convention issues if it did not recognise 
that it was bound. Accordingly, Mousaka supports the 
proposition that the Commercial Court is bound by the Act 
when considering applications under the Arbitration Act.
In light of these three arguments, it should be 
concluded that voluntary arbitration is subject indirectly 
to the Act by virtue of (i) the general duty on arbitrators 
to apply English law and (ii) the obligation of the 
Commercial Court under the Act to apply Convention 
rights albeit to the extent required of an appellate court.
The conclusion that arbitral proceedings should be 
conducted in accordance with the Act applies irrespective 
of the nature of the parties to the arbitration, namely 
private parties or public authorities. The tribunal must 
observe compliant procedures and adopt an interpretation 
of the law in conformity, so far as possible, with the Act. 
This accords to the practice of the courts since the entry 
into force of the Act. See, for example, Douglas and Others v 
Hellol [2001] 2 All ER 289, in which the court of Appeal - 
whilst avoiding the need to decide the issue   recognised 
the requirement of the Act that the courts must themselves 
act compatibly with Convention rights in determining 
disputes between private parties (notably per Sedley LJ). 
This approach circumvents many of the issues of the 
'horizontal' application of the Act that were discussed with 
fortitude at the time of entry into force of the Act.
Waiver: the agreement to arbitrate
The analysis above relies upon the notion of waiver of 
Convention rights. An agreement between parties to 
arbitrate a dispute precludes, or limits, voluntarily those 
parties' right of access to the courts and the determination 
of that dispute in accordance with the court's procedures. 
Whilst the right of access to a court is a right that has been
o o
implied into Article 6 of the Convention, the Court has 
acknowledged the right of parties voluntarily to waive that 
right:
'In the Contracting States' domestic legal systems a waiver ...
isjrequently encountered ... in civil matters, notably in the 
shape ojarbitration clauses in contracts ... The waiver, which 
has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as 
well asjor the administration of justice, does not in principle 
offend against the Convention.' See Deweer v Belgium 
(1 980) 2 EHRR 249, judgment dated 27 February 1980, 
para.49 (a criminal case). (See also R v Switzerland 
(1987) 51 DR83, EcomHR Application 10881/84, 
1987 and X v Germany, Application 1197/61.)
Whilst not every substantive Convention right can be 
waived, where rights can be waived   such as Article 6(1) 
rights - the Court has stipulated three requirements for a 
valid waiver: (i) it must be unequivocal; Oberschlick v Austria 
(1991) 19 EHRR 389; (ii) it must not conflict with an 
important public interest; Hakansson and Struresson v Sweden 
(1991 13 EHRR 1 and (iii) it must be attended by 
minimum guarantees commensurate with the importance 
of the right waived; De Wilde Ooms and Versyp v Belgium 
(No.2) (1971) 1 EHRR 373; (1972) 1 EHRR 438. 
Further, the waiver cannot be given under duress. 
Accordingly, once a party has validly waived his rights, he 
cannot later complain of a breach of those rights.
The significance of the waiver in arbitration was
o
recognised by the Departmental Advisory Committee on 
Arbitration Law: an agreement to arbitrate deprives the 
party of a 'basic right' to go to court. The need for an 
agreement to be in writing under section 5 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 meets the first of the Court's 
requirements. As to the wide interpretation of this 
requirement, see Zambia Steel v Clark 8^ Eaton [1986] 2 
Eloyd's Rep. 225. However, for the purposes of the Act a 
waiver need not be expressed in writing.
Additional issues arise as to the extent of the waiver that 
is reflected in the second and diird requirements. A party 
must be 'fully cognisant' of his waiver. Where an agreement 
to arbitrate refers to the rules of a particular arbitral body, 
the extent of the waiver will clearly extend to the 
procedures set out in those rules (for example, to a private 
hearing). However, the fact that a party agrees to the 
particular rules does not necessarily imply that the party 
agrees to the application of those rules (or the substantive 
law) by an arbitral tribunal in a manner incompatible with 
all Convention rights. For example, not onlv can certain
O 1 ' J
basic substantive rights not be waived, but also it cannot be 
said that agreement to particular rules waives the right to 
an independent and impartial tribunal. In this regard, the 
Convention requires 'minimum guarantees' and retains the 
notion of'important public interest'. Accordingly, it cannot 
be excluded, in theory, that the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings may breach Article 6(1) as the minimum 
guarantees have not been effectively waived.
Waiver: the conduct of the arbitration proceedings
The agreement to arbitrate does not to waive a
o
subsequent (and unforeseen) breach of Article 6(1) during 27
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the conduct of the arbitration. The issue arises as to 
whether a failure to object expediently to that breach may 
constitute a further waiver of Article 6(1) rights. In this 
regard, section 73 of the Arbitration Act 1996 requires that
o ' L
a party to arbitral proceedings must lodge expediently an 
objection to the conduct of the proceedings, failing which 
the party may not raise that objection later before the 
tribunal or the Commercial Court. As any alleged breach 
of Article 6(1) would be characterised as a 'serious 
irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the 
award' Arbitration Act 1996, section 68 and any alleged 
breach of substantive Convention rights would be
o
characterised as a 'question of law', Arbitration Act 1996, 
section 69 objection must be lodged expediently with the 
arbitrators as a matter of English law.
Furthermore, recent Scottish and English case law on7 o
the application of the Act has confirmed any objection to 
alleged breaches of Convention rights must be raised 
expediently. The Inner House of the Court of Session 
considered the issue in Clancy v. Caird, 2000 SLT 546. The 
question was whether the failure of the defender to object 
to a temporary judge hearing his case (on the ground of a 
contravention of Article 6(1)) precluded him from 
subsequently raising that objection. The court held that 
the defender had 'tacitly but unequivocally' waived his 
right to object.
In Times Newspapers Limited v Choudry and Singh, Court of 
Appeal (Peter Gibson and Mance LLJ and Brown J), 17 
December 1999 (unreported), the issue of an alleged 
absence of impartiality and independence arose before the 
Court of Appeal. Having heard argument on Convention 
authorities, the Court of Appeal held that:
'if there had been   or if anyone had conceived that there 
could be- any ground for asking the judge to rescue himself, 
it could, should and we have no doubt would have been 
raised with the judge either on 12 February 1998, or on 
one of the subsequent occasions when the matter was before 
the court for directions leading up to the trial ojthejurther 
or, at absolute latest, at the beginning of that further trial. 
No such objection was made, despite the representation then 
enjoyed by S &^C and Mr. Choudry. If there was any 
objection it was thus waived.'
It follows that it is imperative that any party to an 
arbitration that wishes to raise human rights arguments 
in an application to the Commercial Court must lodge 
an objection expeditiously, or risk waiving those 
arguments.
PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE APPLICATION 
OF THE ACT ^
The practical effect of the indirect application of the 
Act on arbitration proceedings is likely to be limited. The 
limited effect stems from three issues discussed above.
First, the waiver of Article 6( 1) rights, whedier by virtue
of the arbitration agreement or a subsequent failure to 
object, extinguishes the party's ability to raise human 
rights complaints. As noted above, to the extent that a 
waiver has not been validly given or parties object 
expediently on Convention grounds to particular 
procedures or substantive decisions, Convention issues 
will arise for determination. Accordingly, waiver is unlikely 
to extinguish all challenges under Article 6(1).
Second, the rights guaranteed by Article 6(1) are, to a 
substantial degree, encapsulated in the general duty of 
tribunals set out in section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1996 
and the discretionary elements in section 34. In addition, 
those provisions and the conduct of arbitrations must be 
construed in accordance with the rules of natural justice. 
In this respect, only four rights guaranteed by Article 6(1) 
cannot be found in some form in existing requirements: 
(i) access to a court, (ii) the right to a public hearing, (iii) 
the right to the public pronouncement of the decision and 
(iv) the right to a reasoned judgment. The first of three 
these rights (and occasionally all four) are customarily 
waived by the parties in the agreement to arbitrate. The 
indirect application of the Act may however influence 
arbitrators to reason their decisions (to the extent that 
reasons were not previously given) and may found an 
application to the Commercial Court. Indeed, it is 
difficult to identify how the Commercial Court can 
exercise its review in the absence of a reasoned award.
Third, the Convention recognises not only the policy and 
practical necessity to limit review of arbitral awards by the 
courts, but also the restricted grounds of appeal, including 
marginal review of arbitral decisions. Accordingly, the 
practice oi the Commercial Court is unlikely to change 
dramatically. Arbitrators will retain the discretion required 
to retain the characteristics of arbitration.
Whilst the effect is likely to be limited, the indirect 
application of the Act is not without significance. As the 
Lord Chancellor noted during the passage of the Bill, 'A 
culture of awareness of human rights will develop...' Both 
arbitrators and the Commercial Court will be required to 
test and reconsider procedural and substantive points in 
the light of the minimum guarantees of the Convention 
and to interpret English law in accordance with the Act's 
new interpretative obligation. Recent cases indicate that 
this evolutionary process can occur, and is occurring; see, 
for example, Douglas and Others v Hello! supra, R v A, supra, 
and Director General of Fair Trading v The Proprietary Association 
of Great Britain and another [2000] All ER (D) 2425 in 
which the test of 'bias' established in R v Gough [1993] AC 
646 was reviewed and 'modestly adjusted' (para.86) in the 
light of Article 6(1). That evolution does not usurp the 
particular features of arbitration, w
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